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Achieving National Economic and Social Goals:
The Counterproductive Role of Contemporary U.S. Immigration Policy
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
Cornell University
Despite the fact that the United States is in the midst of the largest immigration
experience in its history, there is little recognition of the effects that immigration policy
exerts on parallel policies to achieve national economic and social policies. In its present
state, immigration policy is essentially designed to accommodate political goals. H the
resulting inflow of immigrants were small and widely dispersed, the nation probably
could afford the luxury of allowing immigration to continue on its independent course.
But, the magnitude of immigration is at historic highs; the human capital attributes of
the vast majority of the immigrant inflow is conflicting with emerging economic trends;
and the settlement patterns are undermining the effectiveness of policies in human
resource development and equal employment opportunity policies that are of vital social
concern. To this degree, prevailing immigration policy is functioning in a manner that is
contrary to the national interest. Significant reforms are essential - and the sooner the
better.
Before elaborating, I wish to be clear on one essential point. I do not blame the
immigrants of the current era for what is happening. They are merely taking advantage
of the opportunities that existing immigration policy permits. Immigration is a
discretionary policy of every nation state. No citizen of any foreign nation has a right to
enter any other country for the purpose of permanent settlement or for employment just
because he or she wishes to do so. The opportunities and the conditions in which they
may enter are prescribed by each nation's immigration policies. Hence, in .the
contemporary case of the United States, it is the nation's immigration policy that is the
source of the conflict with the national interest not those who, as individuals, are merely
availing themselves of its terms.
u.s. Immigration Policy in Brief Perspective
As is well known, immigration played a major role in the pre-industrialization era
of the emergence of the United States as the world's economic super power.1 Following
the end of its colonial era in 1776, the new nation expanded geographically across the
North American continent to embrace a vast land area that had an enormous amount of
natural resources and a temperate climate, but relatively few people (the small
indigenous population who resisted incorporation has never been included in the
economic development of the nation). Throughout its first century, the country had
neither ceilings nor screening restrictions on the number and type of people permitted to
enter for permanent settlement. The economy was dominated by agricultural production
and employment. Most jobs required little training or educational preparation. An
unregulated immigration policy was consistent with the nation's basic labor market
needs.
When the industrialization process began in earnest during the latter decades of
the Nineteenth Century, the newly introduced technology of mechanization (i.e., the
substitution of machines for animal and human muscle power) required mainly unskilled
workers to fill manufacturing jobs in the nation's rapidly expanding urban labor markets
3as well as in the other employment sectors of mining, construction, and transportation.
As Stanley Lebergott has observed in his epic study of the development of the U.S. labor
force, "somewhat surprisingly, the greatest beneficiaries of the flow of immigrant labor
[in the 19th Century] was never agriculture though farming was our primary industry:e
Rather, it was the urban economy and its need for a vast number of unskilled workers to
fill the jobs created by the industrialization process whose ranks were expanded by their
arrival.
There were surplus pools of native-born workers who were poorly skilled and
barely educated who remained marginalized throughout the 1880 to 1914 era who could
have filled many of these jobs. They were native-born workers who were underemployed
in the rural sectors of the economy of this same era. Of these, the most notable were
the freed blacks of the former slave economy of the rural South. The noted black
educator, Booker T. Washington, in his famous Atlanta Exposition speech in 1895,
pleaded with white industrialists of that era to draw upon the available black labor force
instead of seeking immigrants to fill the new jobs that industrialization was creating?
His advice was ignored. Mass immigration from Asia and Europe became the
alternative of choice. Before long, immigration from China and Japan was banned in
response to nativist reactions, so various ethnic groups from Eastern and Southern
Europe became the primary sources of unskilled workers of that era.
From purely an efficiency standpoint, the mass immigration of the late Nineteenth
Century and the first part of the Twentieth Century was entirely consistent with the labor
market needs of the nation. The jobs created during this expansive era typically required
4little in the way of skill, education, literacy, or fluency in English from the workforce.
The enormous supply of immigrants who came generally lacked these human capital
attributes. As one immigration scholar at that time wrote: "we may yearn for a more
intelligent and better trained worker from the countries of Europe but it is questionable
whether or not that type of man would have been so well fitted for the work America
had to offer."~ The supply of workers of that era may have been highly heterogeneous
in their personal characteristics, but the demand for labor was essentially homogeneous
in what it required of those who came.
When the land frontiers of the country were overcome in the 1890s, it was not
long before immigration was sharply restricted -- beginning in 1914 with the events
associated with World War I and followed by newly adopted immigration laws in the
early 19208. In part the imposition of legal restrictions reflected legitimate economic
concerns that the mass immigration of the preceding three decades had depressed wages,
hampered unionization, and caused unemployment; in part they also reflected nativist
social reactions to the ethnic, racial, and religious diversity that the mass immigration of
that era also brought.5 The Immigration Act of 1924 (also known as the National
Origins Act) not only imposed the first permanent legislative ceiling on immigration (at a
low annual level of about 154,000immigrants) but it also imposed a screening system
that was highly discriminatory as to who could enter and who could not (favoring
immigrants from Northern and Western European countries and disfavoring or
prohibiting immigration from all other Eastern Hemisphere nations). Its provisions,
however, did not apply to countries of the Western Hemisphere.
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For almost the next 60 years (roughly from 1914 to the late-19605), the
significance of immigration rapidly receded and the expansion of the economy turned to
the utilization of domestic labor reserves. Originally, it was those people in the nation's
vast rural areas where workers were being displaced by the rapid mechanization of
agriculture that had begun in earnest in the 18805who were finally given the opportunity
to compete for jobs in urban America. Among the major beneficiaries of the cessation
of mac.;simmigration was the nation's black population. It was not until mass
immigration ended in 1914 that "the Great Migration" of blacks to the North and the
West could commence. Later during war years of the 19405,it was women, youth,
disabled, and older workers as well as minorities who were recruited and employed in
the economic mainstream for the first time.
Indicative of the declining significance of immigration on American life is the fact
that the percentage of the U.S. population that was foreign born consistently fell from
13.2 percent in 1920 to 4.7 percent in 1970 (the lowest percentage since before the Civil
War). During this period of declining influence of immigration, the U.S. economy
sustained the greatest increases in real wages, employment levels, and production output
in its entire economic history. It was also the time period when the nation adopted an
extensive array of progressive social policies pertaining to labor standards, collective
bargaining, and civil rights. It was also a period when income inequality within the
population was significantly reduced for the first time.
It was not until the mid-1960s that the mass immigration phenomenon was
accidentally revived as a result of domestic political pressures and immigration once
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again became a significant feature of the U.S. economy. The primary concern of
immigration reformers at the time was to end the discriminatory "national origins"
admission system. Having just enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that was designed to
end overt racial and ethnic discrimination in the nation's internal relationships, the next
step in the civil rights struggle was to end overt discrimination in the nation's external
relationships with the international community. There was no intention, however, to
raise the level of immigration by any appreciable amount or to open the admission door
to large numbers of unskilled and poorly educated persons. Indeed, the floor manager in
the Senate for the Immigration Act of 1965, Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), stated during
the final debate on the legislation stated unequivocally that "this bill is not concerned
with increasing immigration to this country, nor will it lower any of the high standards we
apply in selection of immigrants".6 Subsequent events, however, have shown that his
expectations were totally wrong on both accounts.
The Immigration Act of 1965 was a turning point in the history of U.S.
immigration policy. The level of immigrants to be admitted each year was raised to
290,000 immigrants a year plus their immediate relations (spouses, children under 21
years of age, and parents of citizens). All remnants of past overt discrimination on the
basis of race and ethnicity were eliminated from the admission process. A new
admission system was put in place that specified that 74 percent of the annually available
admission visas would be reserved for adult family and extended family members of
persons who were already U.S. citizens or resident aliens. The percentage was increased
to 80 percent in 1980. Thus, family reunification became the primary criterion for the
7admission of legal immigrants. Twenty percent of the available visas were reserved for
the admission of workers who had skills that were needed by employers and which
citizens supposedly did not possess. Thus, Congress "created a policy aimed primarily at
fnlfi11ingthe private interests of its legal residents and their alien relatives and it
simultaneously delegated to these individuals (and to a limited number of its employers)
much of the power to select future citizens and workers in the nation.'17 The opportunity
to redesign the nation's immigration system to serve the public interest was lost. In the
place of the former system that was premised largely on racial and ethnic discrimination,
a new form of discrimination -- nepotism -- became the overriding characteristic of the
legal admission system. Whatever human capital characteristics the vast majority of legal
immigrants possess at the time of their entry is purely incidental to the reason they are
admitted. Only minimal concern was manifested about any possible broad economic
effects that might be the product of the new law's provisions. H the scale of immigration
had remained small, as its supporters had promised, the consequences of such an ill-
designed law would have been of little consequence. But, such was not to be the case.
The Immigration Act of 1965 also provided a formal route for certain refugees to
be admitted on the basis of hum~nitarian concerns. Six percent of the available visas
each year were set aside for this purpose. This was the first time since immigration had
become a subject of regulation that provisions were made for the continuous admission
of refugees as a permanent feature of U.S. immigration policy.
This legislation was also important for what it did not do. It failed to specify any
effective measures to enforce its new provisions. Its supporters did not foresee the
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imminent explosion of illegal immigration that quickly ensued in the years after its
passage.
Within a decade of the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965, it was clear that
immigration policy had gone awry. lllegal immigration had soared; refugee flows greatly
exceeded the number of visas set aside for this purpose; and the number of immediate
relatives arriving were far higher than anticipated. Hence, immigration reform was once
more placed on the national agenda. In 1978, Congress established the Select
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP). It was created to study the
effects of what had transpired over the preceding thirteen years and to make
recommendations for changes. Appointed by President Jimmy Carter, this sixteen-
member commission, chaired by the Rev. Theodore Hesburgh issued its comprehensive
report in 1981.8 It stated that immigration was "out of control"; that the nation must
accept "the reality of limitations"; and that "a cautious approach" should be taken in the
design of any reform measures. It stated unequivocally that: "the Commission has
rejected the arguments of many economists, ethnic groups, and religious leaders for a
great expansion in the number of immigrants and refugees.'9 It went on to say that "this
is not the time for a large-scale expansion in legal immigration - for resident aliens or
temporary workers.ttO
In the wake of the SCIRP report, Congress enacted three major immigration
statutes. They were the Refugee Act of 1980, the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986, and the Immigration Act of 1990. In part, each of these laws embraces some of
the specific recommendations put forth by SCIRP. But each statute also went well
9
beyond SCIRP's recommendations. The result has been to dramatically raise the already
high levels of immigration to even higher plateaus. Indeed, a 1991 study by the Urban
Institute concluded that these statutory changes "have reaffirmed the United States' role
as the principal immigrant-receiving nation in the world.'u The same report found it
"remarkable" that policymakers enacted the Immigration Act of 1990 (which raised legal
immigration levels to 700,000 a year) ''with the nation poised on the brink of a recession
and a war in the Persian Gulf' and at a time "when other industrialized countries are
making theirs [i.e., their immigration policies] more restrictive.'f2
The reason that Congress could take such "remarkable" expansionary actions is
that immigration policy has been allowed to develop without any regard as to its
economic or social consequences. Just as the Select Commission had warned,
immigration policy had been captured by special interest groups with private agendas
that simply ignore any concern for the national interest.
The Revival of Mass Immigration and Its Characteristics
Starting slowly in the latter 1960s, accelerating in the 19708 and 19808, and now
institutionalized in the 19908,mass immigration -- this sleeping giant from out of the
country's distant past -- has once more become a vital characteristic of contemporary
American life. The legal immigration system now guarantees that at least 700,000 legal
immigrants will enter the country every year; the refugee and asylee system now admits
about 130,000people a year (and it is subject to intermittent binges of even greater
numbers), non-immigrant policy permits about 400,000 foreign nationals to legally work
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in the United States on a temporary basis that ranges from 11 months a year up to 5
years depending on specific admission conditions; and the U.S. Bureau of the Census
estimates that about 300,000 illegal immigrants now enter the country each year where
they join a shadow labor force and population estimated in 1994 to total about 4 million
people. To gauge the momentum of the process, it is only necessary to note that it is
estimated that over 10 million immigrants entered the United States in the 1980s (not
counting non-immigrant foreign workers but allowing for uncounted illegal immigrants
and some refugees who have not yet adjusted their status to be counted as immigrants).
This means it was the decade of the largest infusion of immigrants in the country's
history. Of these, 5.8 million entered in the last 5 years of the decade. As a
consequence immigrants accounted for 37 percent of the growth of the U.S. population
during the 19808. The 1990 Census revealed that the foreign born population (which
totalled 19.7 million persons as officially measured but which undoubtedly missed many
more who had illegally entered) had more than doubled the number reported only
twenty years earlier in the 1970 Census. The foreign born population in 1990 officially
accounted for 7.9 percent of the population (with the real rate undoubtedly higher due to
uncounted illegal immigrants). Moreover, in 1991, over 1.8 million persons entered the
country or adjusted their status to become permanent resident aliens - the highest
number of immigrants to do so in any single year in the country's history. Hence, the
decade of the 19908should set yet a new record and the percentage of the population
that is foreign born should be in double digits again by the time of the census for the
year 2000.
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Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that an international social science
research team, Oxford Analytica, stated in its comprehensive study of contemporary
American life that "America's biggest import is people.'t3 But perhaps most significant
of all in regards to this phenomenon is the observation by the demographer Leon
Bouvier in 1991 that, unlike the nation's earlier experiences with mass immigration, this
wave of immigrants shows "no evidence of imminent decline.'tl4
Of even greater significance than the soaring level of immigration to the United
States, however, has been the composition of the post-1965 immigrant inflow. The 1990
Census reveal that the human capital attributes of the foreign born fall into two distinct
categories. On the one hand, about one-fifth of the foreign born adult population (i.e.,
persons 25 years old and over) have a bachelor's degree or higher (20.4 percent) which is
about the same as the native born adult population (20.3 percent). On the other hand,
only 58.8 percent of the foreign born adult population had a high school diploma
compared to 77.0 percent of the native born adult population and, more telling, 25
percent of the foreign born adult population has less than a 9th grade education while
only 10 percent of the adult native born population had such a low level of educational
attainment.iS The 1990 Census also disclosed that 79.1 percent of the foreign born (5
years old and over) speak a language other than English (compared to 7.8 percent of the
native born. Moreover, 47.0 percent of the foreign born (5 years old and over) reported
that they do not speak English "very well.'tl6 The ability to speak English in a service-
oriented economy has been definitively linked to the ability to advance in the labor
market of the post-1965 eraP For these reasons and others, it should come as no
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surprise that incidence of poverty among families of the foreign born population in 1990
was fifty percent higher than that of native born families or that 25 percent of the
families with a foreign born householder who entered the country since 1980 were living
in poverty in 1990.18
There is also a strong pattern of geographic concentration associated with the
post-1965 immigration experience. The 1990 Census revealed that 66 percent of the
foreign born population resided in only six states (California, New York, Florida, Texas,
New Jersey, and lllinois). Furthermore, within all states, the foreign born population
tends to be concentrated in urban centers and especially in their respective central cities.
As Elizabeth Bogen has observed, the current immigration phenomenon is
"overwhelmingly an urban experience.1t19 Indicative of this urban concentration is the
fact that 24 percent of the foreign born population of the nation in 1990 lived in only
seven cities. These cities and the percentage of their respective populations who were
foreign born is as follows: New York (28 percent); Los Angeles (38 percent); Chicago
(17 percent); Houston (18 percent); San Francisco (34 percent); San Diego (21 percent);
and Miami (60 percent). The real percentages are certainly higher if allowances are
made for uncounted illegal immigrants.
The Conflict With Economic and Social Goals
The accidental revival of mass immigration in the 1960s could not have occurred
at a worse time with respect to the efforts of the nation to achieve its economic goals of
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full employment with rising real wages for workers and real incomes for families. It was
in the 1960s that the U.S. labor market began to be transformed from the past patterns
that began at the beginning of the 20th Century.2°
On the labor demand side of the labor market, there are new forces at work
associated with the nature and pace of technological change; the expansion of
international competition; shifts in consumer spending preferences; and, since 1991,
substantial reductions in national defense expenditures. Collectively, these forces are
reshaping the nation's occupational, industrial, and geographic employment patterns.
Employment in most goods-producing industries and in many blue-collar occupations is
declining, while it is increasing in most service industries and many white-collar
occupations. Regional employment trends are extremely unbalanced, with growth
generally more pronounced in urban (but not in central cities) than in rural areas and
particularly strong in the Southeast and Southwest and weak in the Midwest and Prairie
regions.
Future demand for labor lies primarily in service industries located in
metropolitan areas and in occupations that stress cognitive abilities rather than physical
strength and stamina. As Lester Thurow has poignantly written, "the skills of the labor
force are going to be the key competitive weapon in the twenty-first Century ... [for]
skilled labor will be the arms and the legs that allow one to employ - to be the masters
of -- the new product and process technologies that are being generated,el. Conversely,
the escalation in skill requirements has led to diminishing demand for unskilled labor.
William Brock, who served as Secretary of Labor during the Reagan administration, has
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warned that "the days of disguising functional illiteracy with a high paying assembly line
job that simply requires a manual skill are soon to be over. The world of work is
changing right under our feet'e2.
On the labor supply side of the labor market, the nation's labor force has been
growing in size at a pace far greater than all of its major industrial competitors combined
and without precedent in its own history. The demographic positioning of the ''baby
boom" generation which, in the 19908,is located in its prime working age years (ages 32
to 48 in 1994). As a consequence, the nation's labor force participation rate (about 65
percent) is at the highest levels in U.S. history.
Of even greater significance has been the rapid changes in labor force
composition. The fastest growing segments of the labor force are women, minorities,
and immigrants. Women in general and minorities in particular (with the possible
exception of some Asian American groups) have had fewer opportunities to be trained,
educated, or prepared for the occupations that are predicted to increase most in the
coming decade. They are disproportionately concentrated in occupations and industries
already in decline or most vulnerable to decline in the near future. They now find
themselves often in competition with the new immigrant inflow for jobs in these
declining sectors.
Since the 1960s, there has been a marked upward trend in the nation's
unemployment rate. The unemployment rates of the mid-1960s were in the mid-3
percent range. In every succeeding period of prosperity since that decade, the
unemployment rate has tended to be higher than in the preceding prosperity period.
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The annual unemployment rate has not been below 5 percent since 1970. The worst
affected by this secular trend of gradually rising unemployment have been the less skilled
workers whose ranks are disproportionately composed of minorities, youth, and women.
As of late 1994, the unemployment rate has been hovering in the low 6 percent range
even though the economy is not considered to be in a recession.
But even worse has been the effects of what the macro-economist Wallace
Peterson has called "the silent depression" of declining real family incomes.23 This
downward trend began in 1973 and has continued to this day. Studies that have focused
on trends of real earnings also show that they too have been falling since 1973 but the
losses have been the greatest for those with the least education.24 The U.S. Bureau of
the Census, for example, reported in 1991 that white males aged 25-34 with less than a
high school diploma experienced a 42 percent decrease in real earnings from levels that
existed in 1973; high school graduates sustained a 31 percent decrease in their earnings;
those with some college have had a 21 percent decline in earnings; and even college
graduates have experienced a 14 percent decrease in real earnings:S For women and
minorities, the declines have been even worse. In 1994, The Economic Report of the
President confirmed a worsening in the distnoution of income within the nation and its
specifically identified immigration as one of the causative factors.26
When Congress embarked on the course of adopting a politically driven
immigration policy that essentially neglects economic considerations, few people
recognized that the country was entering a phase of fundamental economic change.
Even after the new employment trends became evident in the 19808,the congressional
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committees responsible for designing immigration policy ignored them.
By definition, immigration policy can influence the quantitative size of the labor
force as well as the qualitative characteristics of those it admits. Currently, there is little
synchronization of immigrant flows with demonstrated needs of the labor market. With
widespread uncertainty as to the number of immigrant workers who will enter in any
given year, it is impossible to know in advance of their actual entry how many foreign-
born people will annually join the U.S. labor force. Moreover, whatever skills,
education, linguistic abilities, talents, or loeational settlement preferences most
immigrants and refugees possess are largely accidental to the reason they are legally
admitted or illegally enter.
In fact, the skills and educational attainment level of those immigrants entering
since 1970 have been found to be considerably below those of earlier waves of
immigrants at similar stages of assimilation; their incidence of poverty and
unemployment are also higher than was true of earlier immigrant experiences; and their
labor force participation rate is lower than earlier waves.v As for their use of welfare
programs, they did not exist when earlier waves of immigrants arrived prior to 1914 but,
in comparison to native born persons in current times, the incidence of welfare usage by
immigrants has been found to be higher.28
H immigration were insignificant in its size and if the human capital characteristics
of those entering were consistent with contemporary labor market needs, there would be
little reason to worry about the consequences of such a politically-driven policy. But
neither condition is present. The scale of immigration, in all of its diverse forms, is
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without precedent and mass immigration is disproportionately supplying large numbers of
unskilled, poorly educated, non-English-speaking job seekers into urban centers of the
nation's largest labor markets to add to the competition for jobs and social services with
native-born job seekers who too often share the same paucity of human capital
attributes. Conditions in urban centers -- as indicated by growing welfare rolls, high
unemployment, poor educational performance and high drop-out rates and growing
poverty -- are rapidly deteriorating to the degree that they are threatening the well-being
of the entire nation.
The Imperative of Policy Changes
As indicated, there are factors other than immigration involved in causing the
aforementioned conditions. But this is precisely the point. The labor market is in a
state of rapid transformation with regard to its industrial, occupational, and geographic
changes in employment patterns.29 Many of the causative influences are beyond the
capability of public policies to control -- they can only try to respond in effective and
compassionate manners. likewise social conditions have also come to forefront in these
same years. The Civil Rights Act of 1965 with its historic equal employment opportunity
provisions was enacted the same year that mass immigration was revived. It dramatically
raised the expectations of minorities and women about their futures. In this period of
rapid economic and social change, immigration policy -- which is purely a discretionary
action -- should be shaped to serve the national interest as the country struggles to
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adjust. It is not doing so today.
The number one domestic economic problem facing the United States in the
1990s is what to do with the rapidly increasing surplus of unskilled and poorly educated
job seekers in an era when low skilled jobs are rapidly disappearing. With over 30
million functionally illiterate adults and with reports by the U.S. Department of
Education in 1992 indicating that 90 million adults are not proficient in reading or
mathematical skills, there is no way that this nation can have any foreseeable shortage of
unskilled workers in its future. The major social issue is the struggle to make equal
opportunity a reality -- especially for black Americans. No policy should do harm to that
quest.
An immigration policy that is flexible in the number of persons it allows to enter
the United States legally each year and that admits persons primarily on the basis of the
human capital endowments they have and that the U.S. labor market needs is what is
required. In other words, the nation's immigration policy ought to be accountable for its
consequences.30 The present system is not. It also must be a policy that is firm in the
certainty that its terms will be enforced against illegal entry and refugee abuse. It must
also contain provisions that allow U.S. employers to hire non-immigrant foreign nationals
in only the most extreme labor shortage situations.
Presently, U.S. immigration policy cannot be said to meet the standard of being
designed to raise the real living standards of American workers; to achieve full
employment; and to avoid undermining the effectiveness of efforts to overcome the
legacy of past denial of equal opportunity. It is simply not happening. Indeed, it is
counterproductive to efforts to attain these goals. It is past time to place immigration
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